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ABSTRACT
Much of the educational gradient in trust in politicians remains
unexplained by prevailing theories on material resources and institu-
tional knowledge. Our novel explanation theorizes that: in its rela-
tionship with trust in politicians, education is a status indicator; and
the lower trust in politicians among the less educated reﬂects the
latter’s opposition to the former’s status signaling. Analyses of repre-
sentative Dutch survey data (n = 1,296) demonstrate that indicators
of aﬃnity with elite culture do indeed largely underlie the association
between the level of education and trust in politicians. We discuss
the relevance of our ﬁndings for debates on “culture wars.”
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Introduction
Various studies indicate that the less educated trust politics far less than their more
educated counterparts in various Western societies (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014;
Van der Meer 2010). This remarkable pattern calls for understanding, as political distrust
is considered to be a major challenge to the liberal-democratic order (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012; Dahlberg and Holmberg 2016). Two explanations are conventionally used
to account for the educational gradient in political trust: a materialist and an informa-
tional approach.1 The ﬁrst states that those with ample economic resources gain inﬂuence
in public institutions and society at large, breeding political trust (Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady 1995). As education credentials translate into economic resources in various ways
(Hout 2012), the materialist approach thus attributes the greater political trust among the
more educated to their privileged economic position. Yet, studies indicate that the
disparity in economic resources between the less and more educated hardly accounts for
the educational gradient in trust in politics (Easterbrook, Kuppens, and Manstead 2016;
Van der Meer 2010; Van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2016).
The informational approach proposes that those with less political knowledge have a hard
time interpreting the complex and abstract logics of politics (Galston 2001; Mayne and
Hakhverdian 2017). If the less educated do not approve of the actions of politicians or political
outcomes, they are consequently more likely to attribute these to ill-will and a ﬂawed personal
character (Popkin and Dimock 1999). Although political knowledge is positively associated
with trust in politics in general, just like economic resources, it can only partially account for
the educational gradient in trust in politics (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014).
CONTACT Kjell Noordzij k.noordzij@essb.eur.nl Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, Burg. Oudlaan 50, Mandeville Building, Rotterdam 3000 DR, Netherlands
Color versions of one or more of the ﬁgures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/utsq.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
https://doi.org/10.1080/00380253.2019.1580551
© 2019 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Consequently, we propose a novel, cultural, explanation for that gradient, and empiri-
cally test two necessary conditions for its validity. The focus is on the role of cultural
capital – i.e., aﬃnity with elite culture – and is inspired by two considerations. First,
distrust in politicians is frequently accompanied by ﬁrm accusations of cultural elitism
(see, e.g., Golder 2016; Schoo 2008). Second, it is possible that in its relationship with trust
in politicians, level of education largely serves as a vessel for cultural capital instead of for
economic capital or being politically informed (Van der Waal, De Koster, and Van Noord
2017). Taken together, this suggests that the more educated’s greater aﬃnity with cultu-
rally elitist repertoires, stemming from prolonged socialization in legitimate institutions
such as higher education and public service television and radio (Lamont and Lareau
1988; Lareau 2015; Surridge 2016), inspires their greater trust in politicians. The less
educated, on the other hand, feel symbolically excluded from politics because the cultu-
rally elitist standard, i.e. the “superiority signaling” or “status signaling” of establishment
politicians, denotes their opposing lifestyle and attitudes as inferior (Lamont and Lareau
1988; cf., Kazin 1998; Oliver and Rahn 2016). We suggest that this motivates their distrust
in politicians.
In short, we argue that the educational gradient in trust in politicians signiﬁes a “status-
based cultural conﬂict”: the high-status signals of establishment politicians incite opposi-
tion among low-status groups who feel that their lifestyle and attitudes are looked down
on. To assess this, we focus on a Western European context with a marked educational
gradient in political trust for which the required representative survey data are available:
the Netherlands. In so doing, we answer the research question: Can the educational
gradient in trust in politicians be understood as part of a status-based cultural conﬂict?
A Status-Based Cultural Conﬂict: Superiority Signaling by Establishment
Politicians and the Opposition It Inspires among the Less Educated
In addition to a strong economic position and possessing ample political knowledge, the
more educated also have more cultural capital, which is the main pillar of our explanation.
Following Lamont and Lareau (1988: 164), we understand cultural capital as an indivi-
dual’s familiarity with a “widely shared, legitimate culture made up of high status cultural
signals (attitudes, preferences, behaviors and goods) used in direct or indirect social and
cultural exclusion.” As a consequence, we will also refer to possessing cultural capital as
having aﬃnity with elite culture. For the problem at hand, we stress that, in addition to
underlying inequality reproduction via cultural reproduction in educational institutions
and the labor market (Jæger and Breen 2016; Rivera 2015), the unequal distribution of
cultural capital between the less and more educated also has political ramiﬁcations (cf.,
Achterberg and Houtman 2006; Houtman 2001; Van der Waal, Achterberg, and Houtman
2007; Van der Waal et al. 2010; Van der Waal and De Koster 2015). Below, we theorize
about how the less educated’s low aﬃnity with elite culture inspires disenfranchisement
from the contemporary political order in Western societies.
More speciﬁcally, we theorize that the less educated’s political disenfranchisement
reﬂects frustration and disgust toward those who denote their attitudes and preferences
as vulgar and inappropriate, namely those at the summit of the cultural capital distribu-
tion, such as establishment politicians. Frustration and disgust among “the culturally
inferior” toward the ways of life, censoriousness or ﬁnger-wagging of the “culturally
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dominant” establishment politicians (Raines, Goodwin, and Cutts 2017) has already been
emphasized in the seminal literature on cultural capital (Lamont and Lareau 1988). Many
years later, it is reﬂected in dissatisfaction toward establishment politicians, as it is voiced
with ﬁrm accusations of cultural elitism (see, e.g., Golder 2016; Schoo 2008).2 In other
words, perceived superiority or status signaling by establishment politicians is what
disenfranchises the average less-educated citizen, indicating a cultural conﬂict between
low- and high-status groups.
For a proper understanding of the education gap in trust in politicians as a status-based
cultural conﬂict, it is vital to address the attributes with which establishment politicians
signal superiority in contemporary Northwest European countries. Or, in other words,
which attributes of less-educated citizens are considered to be inferior by establishment
politicians and their more-educated constituency in those countries? We argue that two
diﬀerences in preferences are particularly intertwined with notions of superiority and
inferiority in the Northwest European context. The ﬁrst is the opposition between high-
brow and lowbrow preferences and consumption – the standard cultural capital indicator
used in empirical studies from the 1980s onwards (Bourdieu 1984; DiMaggio and Mohr
1985; Jæger and Breen 2016). The second is often referred to as an “emerging” aspect of
cultural capital: cosmopolitanism (Prieur and Savage 2013; Savage, Wright, and Gayo-Gal
2010), or, put diﬀerently, being open and reﬂexive regarding cultural diﬀerences (Bryson
1996; Ollivier 2008). We will refer to this as cultural liberalism, which is the shorthand
most often used in the study of politics (cf., Currid-Halkett 2017).
Tellingly, highbrow cultural preferences and cultural liberalism ﬁgure prominently in
accusations concerning politicians’ cultural elitism (Golder 2016; Schoo 2008). The less
educated scorn the highbrow preferences of establishment politicians and their adherents
(Frank 2004: 16). This indicates that politicians are “people not like them” (Gelman 2009:
15; cf., Spruyt and Kuppens 2015b), and inspires reactions varying from “concealed
hostility towards the reﬁned or the ‘posh’” (Bennett et al. 2010: 211), to outright mockery
of politicians’ “‘ﬁne’ socio-cultural modes of distinction” (Schoo 2008: 182).
In addition, the average less-educated citizen accuses establishment politicians of
“promoting liberal values” (Golder 2016: 479). They experience establishment politicians
and their more-educated constituency’s critiques on their cultural conservatism as patron-
izing and censorious (cf., Gest 2016; Raines, Goodwin, and Cutts 2017). Such a critique on
the lifestyles and attitudes of the average less-educated citizen was recently characterized
by a prominent Dutch right-wing populist politician as “a punitive expedition and an act
of revenge on people considered as hoi polloi” by “the cosmopolitan elites of the
Netherlands” (Omroep PowNed 2018). In other words, it is suggested that establishment
politicians and their more-educated adherents consider many less-educated citizens to be
morally and culturally inferior plebs (Schoo 2008), and disqualify their cultural prefer-
ences and conservatism as inappropriate and irrational (Sommer 2017; Van der Waal, De
Koster, and Van Noord 2017). Recent remarks by two prominent establishment politicians
speak volumes in this regard: U.S. presidential candidate Hillary Clinton labeled Donald
Trump supporters as “deplorables” (Miller 2016: ﬁrst paragraph), while Martin Schulz,
former President of the European Parliament, openly called for a “revolt of the decent” to
battle the political preferences of right-wing populists (Visser 2018: ﬁfth paragraph).
In summary, establishment politicians signal superiority via highbrow taste and cultural
liberalism, and consequently frown upon the lowbrow taste and cultural conservatism of
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the average less-educated citizen in contemporary Northwest European countries like the
Netherlands. As a result, we theorize that the less educated feel symbolically excluded
from politics, inciting opposition and distrust. If this is the case, one would expect
highbrow cultural consumption (hypothesis 1a) and cultural liberalism (hypothesis 1b) to
be positively associated with trust in politicians. In addition, one would expect the
educational gradients in highbrow cultural consumption (hypothesis 2a) and cultural
liberalism (hypothesis 2b) to account for the educational gradient in trust in politicians.
In statistical terms, one would anticipate that the positive association of level of education
with trust in politicians declines signiﬁcantly in strength if highbrow cultural consumption
and cultural liberalism are added to the model.
If these hypotheses are corroborated, two necessary conditions for the validity of our
explanation are met: a) aﬃnity with elite culture is positively associated with trust in
politicians; and b) the less (more) educated’s low (high) aﬃnity with elite culture is what
accounts for their low (high) trust in politicians. Given that the required measures are
only available in cross-sectional survey data (see below), this is the best test of our
explanation that we can oﬀer. In the concluding section, we discuss how future research
using new data collections and advanced methods could provide more in-depth empirical
scrutiny of the underlying mechanisms.
Data and Operationalization
Data
To test our hypotheses, we analyzed survey data on lifestyles, political attitudes and
behavior, and institutional trust that were collected as part of a larger research project
in the Netherlands (Achterberg et al. 2012). CentERdata, which carefully maintains
a representative panel of the Dutch population, ﬁelded a survey in 2012. Of the 1,707
potential respondents sampled, 1,302 completed the questionnaire. The response rate of
76.3 percent is somewhat higher than in the 2012 wave of the Cultural Change in the
Netherlands survey (Coumans and Knops 2012), and is comparable to the 2012 wave of
the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (Oudejans 2013).
Excluding six respondents who completed the survey in 10 minutes or less, which is the
minimum time reasonably required to provide valid responses, left us with 1,296 respon-
dents. Table A1 in the Appendix contains details on items, coding, and factor analyses for
the multi-item measures discussed below.
Operationalization of the Main Variables
Our dependent variable, trust in politicians, is measured by asking how much
a respondent trusts politicians, with response categories ranging from 1 (absolutely
no trust) to 5 (certainly a lot of trust). A higher score thus indicates more trust in
politicians.
Education is measured using the number of years needed to attain the reported level of
education. This ranges from 8 (primary education) to 18 (university degree).
The dataset includes four items for highbrow cultural consumption, which are conven-
tionally used as an indicator for cultural capital (cf., DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; DiMaggio
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and Mukhtar 2004; Ten Kate, De Koster, and Van der Waal 2017; Van der Waal and De
Koster 2015). These items combine in a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.800), with
a higher score denoting more highbrow cultural consumption. Appendix A2 reports the
exact wording and scale characteristics of highbrow cultural consumption and all the other
multi-item scales used in this study.
Cultural liberalism is measured by means of a short version of Adorno et al.’s (1950)
F-scale, a widely used indicator for a dislike of diﬀerence and diversity (cf., Achterberg
and Houtman 2009; Cornelis and Alain 2014; Van der Waal and De Koster 2015). We
constructed a reliable 7-item scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.764). Higher scores indicate more
culturally liberal attitudes. Note that a robustness check (see below) assesses whether our
conclusions are aﬀected if we use an alternative measure of cultural liberalism.
Control Variables
We include income as a measure for the economic position of the respondents, enabling us
to account for the materialist approach. Net monthly household income is measured in
thousands of Euros. Higher scores indicate higher incomes.
We include institutional knowledge to account for the informational approach, utilizing
a measure previously used in the Dutch context (Van der Waal and De Koster 2015). Each
respondent had to answer a randomly selected subset of seven out of 21 questions on the
political and legal aspects of the European Union. The respondents answered each question
incorrectly (0) or correctly (1), and we created an index by calculating the sum score.
Although items speciﬁcally directed at national politics were not available, Ackerman
(2000: 78–79) has demonstrated that scales measuring knowledge on a wide range of domains
correlate substantially with one another, and with diverse measurements of cognitive ability.
We also control for: religious denomination, which is recoded to 1 (no religious
denomination), 2 (Protestant), 3 (Catholic), and 4 (Other); and attendance at religious
services, coded as 1 (no attendance), 2 (occasional attendance), and 3 (frequent atten-
dance). We control for non-native using a variable indicating whether a respondent is
a native (both parents born in the Netherlands) or non-native Dutch citizen (at least one
parent born outside the Netherlands). This is in line with the commonly used deﬁnitions
of Statistics Netherlands.
We also control for the urban character of the area where the respondents live. We use
a measure with response categories ranging from 1 (not urban) to 5 (very strongly urban).
We control for gender by asking whether a respondent was male (0) or female (1); and age,
measured in years. We also control for whether a respondent has a partner (1) or not (0),
and for whether (1) or not (0) s/he has children living at home.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the variables discussed above.
Results
We aim to assess empirically whether two necessary conditions for the validity of our
explanation are met. If the educational gradient in political trust does indeed reﬂect a status-
based cultural conﬂict: (1) trust in politicians needs to be positively related to highbrow
cultural consumption (hypothesis 1a) and cultural liberalism (hypothesis 1b); and (2) the
educational gradients in highbrow cultural consumption (hypothesis 2a) and cultural
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liberalism (hypothesis 2b) need to account for the educational gradient in trust in politicians.
Before testing our hypotheses, we address the bivariate relationships between our variables
of interest presented in Table 2. This indicates that, in line with our theorizing, trust in
politicians is positively correlated not only with level of education, but also with highbrow
cultural consumption and cultural liberalism. A proper test of our hypotheses does, how-
ever, call for multivariate regression analyses in which the competing claims of the materi-
alist and informational approaches, as well as other control variables, are accounted for.
Table 3 contains the linear (OLS) regression analyses. It should be noted that our ﬁrst
robustness check (discussed below) assesses whether logistic regression analyses of
a dichotomized version of our dependent variable lead to the same conclusions. Model 1
shows how education relates to trust in politicians after controlling for variables that
account for the materialist (income) and informational (institutional knowledge)
approaches, as well as all the conventional control variables in the study of political trust
discussed above. Figure 1 visualizes that relationship, indicating that educational diﬀerences
in trust in politicians are substantial: 0.435 points on a range of 1–5. Clearly, an additional
approach to the materialist and informational ones is needed to explain these diﬀerences.
Model 2 adds highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism as a ﬁrst step to
discovering whether our theory is a likely candidate for such an additional approach. As both
are positively related to trust in politicians, hypotheses 1a and 1b are corroborated. A second
step is required for a strict test of hypotheses 2a and 2b. Model 2 of Table 3 indicates that
entering highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism results in a strongly declined
and insigniﬁcant eﬀect of education. Additional analyses are, however, required to determine
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
n Mean SD Min Max
Trust in politicians 1,263 2.867 1.033 1 5
Cultural liberalism 1,263 3.010 0.633 1.286 5
Income 1,295 2.652 1.394 0 13.729
Highbrow cultural consumption 1,271 2.236 0.940 1 5
Institutional knowledge 1,242 4.396 1.315 1 7
Education 1,295 14.544 2.749 8 18
Female 1,296 0.444 0 1
Age 1,296 56.633 15.242 16 90
Non-native 1,274 0.080 0 1
Religious denomination (no religious denomination) 1,296 0.458 0 1
Religious denomination (Protestant) 1,296 0.208 0 1
Religious denomination (Catholic) 1,296 0.275 0 1
Religious denomination (other religious denomination) 1,296 0.058 0 1
Attendance at religious services (no attendance) 1,280 0.549 0 1
Attendance at religious services (occasional attendance) 1,280 0.318 0 1
Attendance at religious services (frequent attendance) 1,280 0.133 0 1
Partner 1,296 0.676 0 1
Urban character 1,288 3.045 1.327 1 5
Children 1,296 0.277 0 1
Table 2. Bivariate correlations of main variables with trust in
politicians.
Education 0.140***
Highbrow cultural consumption 0.173***
Cultural liberalism 0.246***
Calculations on Achterberg et al. (2012); *** p < .001.
6 K. NOORDZIJ ET AL.
whether adding these variables signiﬁcantly contributes to a decline in the association between
education and trust in politicians. Table 4 sets out the results of these decomposition analyses,
which use the KHB method (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013).
The ﬁrst row in Table 4 shows the initial eﬀect of education on trust in politicians if all
the control variables are included (thus reﬂecting Model 1 of Table 3). The second row
reports how much of the education eﬀect remains after adding highbrow cultural con-
sumption and cultural liberalism to the model (thus reﬂecting Model 2 of Table 3), while
the third row reports the diﬀerence between rows 1 and 2 and whether this diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant. Below that, the coeﬃcients indicate whether highbrow cultural consumption
and cultural liberalism signiﬁcantly contribute to the decline in strength of the eﬀect of
education – which they both do: 30.04 percent and 40.91 percent, respectively. In other
Table 3. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis for trust in
politicians.
Model 1 Model 2
Independents
Education 0.043*** 0.013
(0.011) (0.011)
Highbrow cultural consumption 0.124***
(0.036)
Cultural liberalism 0.291***
(0.050)
Controls
Income 0.063** 0.045
(0.024) (0.023)
Institutional knowledge 0.076*** 0.066**
(0.022) (0.022)
Female 0.167** 0.139*
(0.060) (0.058)
Age −0.009*** −0.008**
(0.002) (0.002)
Non-native −0.289** −0.259*
(0.107) (0.105)
Religious denomination
No religious denomination (ref.)
Protestant −0.045 0.013
(0.089) (0.087)
Catholic 0.008 0.092
(0.080) (0.079)
Other religious denomination −0.054 −0.048
(0.135) (0.131)
Attendance at religious services
No attendance (ref.)
Occasional attendance 0.207** 0.176*
(0.074) (0.072)
Frequent attendance 0.514*** 0.489***
(0.103) (0.101)
Partner −0.099 −0.036
(0.072) (0.071)
Urban character −0.009 −0.022
(0.022) (0.022)
Children −0.140 −0.108
(0.078) (0.077)
Constant 2.184*** 1.495***
(0.251) (0.276)
R2 0.080 0.126
n 1,206 1,206
Calculations on Achterberg et al. (2012); unstandardized coeﬃcients; standard
errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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words, the education gap in trust in politicians, as illustrated in Figure 1, is largely
(70.95 percent in total) explained by the educational gradients in highbrow cultural
consumption and cultural liberalism, thus corroborating hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Robustness Checks
In order to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings, we conducted three series of additional
analyses.
First, our main analyses include a single 5-point item as the dependent variable in the
linear (OLS) regression analyses. This produces results that are easy to interpret, but one
could argue that this violates the assumption of OLS regression that the dependent variable
should be at least of an interval level. We therefore replicated our main analyses with logistic
Figure 1. Predicted levels of trust in politicians for the least and most educated (bars), based on model
1 of Table 3. The diﬀerence between the least and most educated is 0.435 (p < .001).
Table 4. Decomposition of total eﬀect of education on trust in politicians into direct and indirect eﬀects
via highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism.
Total eﬀect education 0.043***
(0.011)
Direct eﬀect education 0.013
(0.011)
Indirect eﬀect education 0.031*** Explained percentage of initial eﬀect education
(0.005) Per separate indicator Total
Indirect eﬀects of education via…
Highbrow cultural consumption 0.013*** 30.04% 70.95%
(0.004)
Cultural liberalism 0.018*** 40.91%
(0.004)
n 1,206
Calculations on Achterberg et al. (2012); unstandardized coeﬃcients; standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01,
*** p < .001; controlling for all control variables.
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regression analyses on a dichotomized version of our dependent variable. Answer categories
1 and 2 were coded as 0 (37.85 percent of the respondents with valid answers) and the others
as 1 (62.15 percent of the respondents with valid answers). Just as in our main analyses,
education was signiﬁcantly and positively associated with trust in politicians in a model that
included all the control variables (p = .011). Furthermore, both highbrow cultural con-
sumption and cultural liberalism were also signiﬁcantly associated with trust in politicians
(p < .0005 in both cases), corroborating hypotheses 1a and 1b. After adding these variables
to the model, the eﬀect of education is no longer signiﬁcant (p = .936), and a decomposition
analysis developed for logistic regression analyses (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013) indi-
cates that highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism contribute signiﬁcantly to
the decline in the eﬀect of education: 54.01 percent and 42.75 percent, respectively (p < .001
in both cases). This corroborates hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Second, our main analyses use the well-established F-scale for authoritarianism as
a measure for cultural liberalism. As this captures a dislike of diﬀerence and diversity in
a broad sense, it is well suited to the aim of this paper. One could, however, argue that
contemporary public debates in Northwest European countries focus on a speciﬁc aspect
of diversity, i.e., ethnic diversity. We have therefore conducted alternative analyses in
which cultural liberalism was measured with a reverse-coded reliable (Cronbach’s α =
0.868) 6-item scale for ethnocentrism, which was recently used in the Dutch context (e.g.,
Van Bohemen, De Koster, and Van der Waal 2018). Again, in a model including all the
control variables, we found a signiﬁcant positive association between education and trust
in politicians (p < .0005). We also identiﬁed signiﬁcant positive associations of trust in
politicians with both highbrow cultural consumption and this alternative measure for
cultural liberalism (p = .001 and p < .0005, respectively). This corroborates hypotheses 1a
and 1b. In addition, we found that the eﬀect of education is no longer signiﬁcant (p =
.192) once highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism are included in the
model. A decomposition analysis shows that the latter variables signiﬁcantly underlie the
decline in the strength of the education eﬀect: 25.58 percent (p < .01) and 41.62 percent
(p < .001), respectively. This corroborates hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Third, our ﬁndings strongly suggest that the educational gradient in trust in politicians
is part of a status-based cultural conﬂict, in which the less educated oppose the superiority
signaling of politicians via highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism. Our
theorizing suggests that there are also substantial educational gradients in trust in other
professionals who are at the summit of the cultural capital distribution, and that these can
be explained by opposition to superiority signaling. Our survey includes measures for trust
in two types of professional: scientists and judges. Assessing the explanatory value of our
theorizing for the educational gradients in trust in judges and scientists provides
a robustness check for our central ﬁndings.
A ﬁrst indication of its explanatory value in those cases is that previous research
demonstrates that the educational gradients in trust in judges and scientists are also
substantial. Such studies also show that the materialist and informational approaches
only partly account for those gradients (Achterberg, De Koster, and Van der Waal 2017;
Benesh 2006; Bolton and Gardner 2014; Gauchat 2012) – just as in the case of the
educational gradient in trust in politicians. The second indication that our theory has
explanatory value for the educational gradients in trust in judges and scientists is that such
professionals are generally more culturally liberal than the less educated (De Keijser, Van
THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 9
Koppen, and Elﬀers 2007; Gross and Fosse 2012). In line with these well-established
patterns, they are also accused of having a “liberal bias” (Gross and Fosse 2012: 128)
and being culturally elitist (Gauchat 2012; Golder 2016).
The litmus test of the relevance of our theorizing for explaining educational gradients
in trust in judges and scientists is provided in Table 5. This contains the same type of
decomposition analysis as reported in Table 4, and generally supports our expectations.
The eﬀect of education on both trust in judges and scientists (controlling for the same
variables as in our main analyses) declines signiﬁcantly in strength if highbrow cultural
consumption and cultural liberalism are added to the model. The latter variables both
contribute signiﬁcantly to the decline in these eﬀects of education. This indicates that the
educational gradient in trust in politicians is part of a more encompassing educational
gradient in trust in institutional professionals, reﬂecting a status-based cultural conﬂict. In
this conﬂict, the average less-educated citizen resists the superiority or status signaling via
highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism of those professionals.
Conclusion and Discussion
Inspired by the ﬁnding that conventional materialist and informational approaches do not
suﬃce when it comes to explaining the well-established educational gradient in trust in
politicians, we formulated an additional approach and scrutinized two necessary condi-
tions for its empirical tenability, focusing on the Dutch case. We suggest that level of
education serves as an indicator for cultural capital – in short: aﬃnity with elite culture –
in that gradient. Our theory is therefore that the superiority signaling of establishment
politicians disenfranchises the less educated, as it denotes their opposing lifestyles and
attitudes as inferior.
Tellingly, and in line with our approach, the conﬂict between establishment politicians
and their typically more-educated constituency on the one hand, and average, less-
educated citizens and the anti-establishment politicians who represent them on the
other, is riddled with superiority signaling and opposition. The former implicitly qualify
the latter as indecent because of their lifestyles and attitudes (Martin Schulz quoted in
Table 5. Decomposition of total eﬀect of education on trust in judges and scientists into direct and
indirect eﬀects via highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism. The total eﬀect of education
is estimated while controlling for all control variables also used in Tables 3 and 4.
Trust in judges Trust in scientists
Total eﬀect education 0.056*** Explained percentage of initial
eﬀect education
0.061*** Explained percentage of initial
eﬀect education(0.009) (0.008)
Direct eﬀect education 0.022* 0.037***
(0.010) (0.009)
Indirect eﬀect education 0.034*** 0.024***
(0.005) Per separate indicator Total (0.004) Per separate indicator Total
Indirect eﬀects of education via…
Highbrow cultural consumption 0.010** 18.20% 61.56% 0.014*** 23.28% 38,94%
(0.003) (0.003)
Cultural liberalism 0.024*** 43.36% 0.010*** 15.66%
(0.004) (0.003)
n 1,205 1,204
Calculations on Achterberg et al. (2012); unstandardized coeﬃcients; standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01,
*** p < .001.
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Visser 2018), or do so explicitly by describing them as “deplorables” (Hillary Clinton
during the 2016 presidential elections; see Miller 2016) or “white trash (…) with retarded
ideas (…), coarse, boorish, brute, vulgar, and unmannered” (Dutch public intellectual Anil
Ramdas 2010: 14th paragraph). Less-educated citizens and their political representatives in
turn mock the cultural elitism of establishment politicians and their constituencies (e.g.,
Golder 2016; Schoo 2008), which they refer to as “cosmopolitan elites” (Omroep PowNed
2018).
Our analyses suggest that the quotes above reﬂect a status-based cultural conﬂict that
underlies the educational gradient in trust in politicians and other professionals at the
pinnacle of the cultural capital distribution, such as judges and scientists. More speciﬁ-
cally, we demonstrate that it is the low (high) aﬃnity with two crucial superiority signaling
attributes – highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism – of the less (more)
educated that underlies their low (high) trust in politicians. Before discussing the wider
implications of these ﬁndings, it ﬁrst needs to be stressed that they merely provide an
initial indication of the empirical tenability of our theorizing. Due to data limitations, we
were only able to test two necessary conditions, but there are at least four ways in which
future research could test our theory more systematically.
First, in order to scrutinize our theory empirically, we focused on behaviors and
attitudes that are undeniably riddled with notions of superiority and inferiority in the
Dutch context: highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism. Nevertheless,
when it comes to the latter, the survey data available do not allow us to systematically
disentangle the eﬀect of superiority signaling or ﬁnger-wagging from so-called ideological
incongruence, i.e., a mismatch in policy preferences between establishment politicians and
the average less-educated citizen, which is especially salient concerning cultural liberalism
(Schakel and Hakhverdian 2018; Van Ditmars and De Lange 2018). The fact that our
ﬁndings for highbrow cultural consumption and cultural liberalism are very similar
already suggests that there is more to the latter than simple ideological incongruence.
However, population-based survey experiments (Mutz 2011) could be used to rigorously
assess whether the eﬀects of cultural liberalism should indeed be interpreted as pertaining
to superiority signaling. In these experiments, attitudinal attributes (e.g., pro versus contra
lenient immigration policies) are systematically varied with superiority signaling attributes
(e.g., presenting lenient positions on immigration policies in a censorious way or not).
A study by Legault and colleagues (2011) already hints that superiority signaling in itself
incites opposition: the racial prejudice of respondents who were primed with ﬁnger-
wagging anti-racism messages increased. Population-based survey experiments could
also be used to strictly test the causal direction in our theorizing, which assumes that
the superiority signaling of politicians inspires distrust among less-educated citizens.
Second, the attitudinal aspect of superiority signaling is likely to be more encompassing
than cultural liberalism. Bones of contention other than issues of cultural diversity, such as
environmental issues (tellingly also referred to as “the postmaterialist green movement of
the educated classes”; Ivarsﬂaten 2008: 8), also seem to have a superiority signaling aspect
(Achterberg 2015; Frank 2004) that is challenged by the less educated (Kvaløy, Finseraas,
and Listhaug 2012; McCright, Dunlap, and Marquart-Pyatt 2015). The attitudinal aspect
of the status-based cultural conﬂict consequently seems to be broader than accounted for
in our analyses. Additionally, there is likely to be cross-national variation in the type of
attitudinal oppositions that are riddled with notions of superiority and inferiority. Future
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studies could uncover which ones are present and play a role in the educational gradient
in trust in politicians that is reported in many Western countries.
Third, we focused on an educational gradient, while other social fault lines might also
reﬂect a status-based cultural conﬂict. An example is the geographic fault line, where hints
and accusations of the cultural backwardness of those living outside culturally dominant
locations abound (Dionne Jr. 2012; Hayes 2012), inspiring the mockery of “sophisticated
urban liberals” (Kazin 1998: 173) in return. Disenfranchisement from the institutional
order by those living in culturally peripheral regions might very well be a response to
superiority signaling by those living in cultural capitals like Amsterdam, London, Paris,
and New York. If so, then the status-based cultural conﬂict would encompass both
educational and geographic fault lines. This is for future research to analyze.
Fourth, the rise and contextual salience of the status-based cultural conﬂict calls for
further scrutiny. It seems likely that this conﬂict arose when those socialized in post-1960s
counterculture academia, especially in the social sciences and humanities, started to
populate the rank and ﬁle of political institutions. They are the most culturally liberal
social category discerned (Gross and Fosse 2012), and the legitimization of their attitudes
and preferences as “superior” by their societal positions likely disenfranchises those
holding opposing views. Accordingly, we believe that the status-based cultural conﬂict
rose in salience in the 1970s/1980s. Tellingly, the educational gradient in trust in politi-
cians also increased in importance from that period onward in Northwest Europe; before
that, the less and more educated often barely diﬀered in this respect (Aarts, Van Ham, and
Thomassen 2017; Bovens and Wille 2017). This seems to be a further indication that this
educational gradient reﬂects a status-based cultural conﬂict. Turning to its contextual
salience, this conﬂict is likely to be most pertinent in countries and periods in which the
attitudes of the cultural elite diverge most strongly from those with limited cultural capital,
and are most strongly riddled with superiority claims. One would expect the most marked
educational gaps in trust in politicians in such contexts. Studies using cross-national and
longitudinal surveys could shed light on the rise and contextual salience of the status-
based cultural conﬂict.
This brings us to the implications of our ﬁndings on a Northwest European country for
scholarly debates on the American culture wars. To typify the latter’s central fault line
between cultural liberals and conservatives, Frank (2004: 16-17) has already noted the type
of accusation that he referred to as “the latte libel: the suggestion that liberals are
identiﬁable by their tastes and consumer preferences and that these tastes and preferences
reveal the essential arrogance and foreignness of liberalism” (cf., Hunter 1992; Nunberg
2006). Consequently, the opposition it inspires among, especially, the less educated and
those in rural areas or the “heartland” might not just be driven by opposing attitudes, but
also by opposition to the superiority signaling of liberal elites. In short, the American
culture wars might also reﬂect a status-based cultural conﬂict, which future research could
uncover.
Finally, a key question concerns why an educational gradient in trust in politicians is
relevant. Although seminal studies on political trust have already stressed that a certain
level of distrust can be very healthy for the functioning of democracy (cf., Easton 1975;
Hart 1978), it seems to be less healthy if it reﬂects the disenfranchisement of people who
feel looked down on by politicians. Our analyses imply that it is not (only) their policy
preferences on, for instance, immigration (De Koster et al. 2014) and free trade (Van der
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Waal and De Koster 2015, 2018) that per se inspire the less educated to vote for anti-
establishment parties and politicians, but a political climate denoting their lifestyle and
preferences as illegitimate. If so, then other types of accommodation of the less-educated’s
preferences than a turn to illiberal democracy are viable. More empathy and respect for
non-elitist tastes and preferences (cf., Hochschild 2016) could already alleviate the status-
based cultural conﬂict indicated by our analyses.
Notes
1. What we refer to as the “informational approach”, as suggested by one of our reviewers, is often
referred to as the “rationalist approach” (cf., Galston 2001; Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017).
2. What might account for the under-utilization of insights on cultural capital for understand-
ing educational gradients in political attitudes and behaviors is that, according to Bourdieu,
those with a low aﬃnity with elite culture demonstrate docility: being aware of the value
bestowed upon elitist cultural expressions, “declarations of indiﬀerence are exceptional, and
hostile rejection even rarer” (Bourdieu 1984: 319). On the one hand, this seems to be at odds
with the current mocking of cultural elites, which was less prominent during Bourdieu’s
study of France in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, those with a low aﬃnity with elite
culture still feel less entitled to state an opinion in political matters (Myles 2008; Ten Kate, De
Koster, and Van der Waal 2017). As a result, determining which aspects of superiority
signaling are accepted as legitimate, and which inspire outright hostile rejection, is an
empirical question (cf., Spruyt and Kuppens 2015a).
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Appendix
Table A1. Details on multi-item measures.
Item Questions and response categories Factor loadings
Highbrow cultural consumptiona
How many books do you own? [Range answer categories recoded from (1) to (6) to (1) less than 50 to
(5) 1,000 or more]
0.675
How often do you attend an art exhibition? [Range answer categories recoded from (1) to (4) to (1)
never, or almost never to (5) more than six times a year]
0.826
How often do you discuss art and culture? [Range answer categories recoded from (1) to (4) to (1)
almost never to (5) almost always]
0.843
Do you consider yourself a lover of the arts and culture? [Range answer categories recoded from (1) to
(3) to (1) deﬁnitely not to (5) absolutely]
0.840
Eigenvalue 2.554
R2 0.638
Cronbach’s α 0.800
Cultural liberalismc Range: (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree.b
There are two sorts of people: the strong and the weak 0.648
Most people are disappointing when you get to know them better 0.624
Young people often revolt against social institutions that they ﬁnd unjust; however, when they get
older they ought to become resigned to reality
0.639
Our social problems would be largely solved if we could only somehow remove criminal and antisocial
elements from society
0.707
What we need are fewer laws and institutions and more courageous, tireless and devoted leaders
whom people can trust
0.613
People with bad manners, habits, and upbringing can hardly be expected to know how to associate
with decent people
0.615
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn 0.664
Eigenvalue 2.911
R2 0.416
Cronbach’s α 0.764
Institutional knowledged [Correct/Incorrect]
During the eighty years preceding the European Union, Germany and France were at war three times
[Correct]
Norway was a member of the European Union, but has withdrawn [Incorrect]
Sweden is a member of the European Union [Correct]
Sweden also uses the Euro [Incorrect]
The European Union has more powers than any other international organization [Correct]
If member states agree, they can decrease the powers of the European Union [Correct]
The European Parliament can veto all European legislation [Incorrect]
If a member state does not live up to the rules of the internal market, the European Court of Justice can
impose a sanction [Correct]
The European Commission employs between 30,000 and 35,000 civil servants [Correct]
The European Commission employs hardly more civil servants than the cities of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam do together [Correct]
Van Rompuy is the chairman of the European Commission [Incorrect]
In the Netherlands, twice as many people went to the ballots during the Parliamentary Elections of 2010
as during the elections for the European Parliament [Correct]
The European Parliament always assembles in Brussels [Incorrect]
The European Union has its own taxes [Incorrect]
The European Union roughly spends between 100 and 150 billion Euros per year [Correct]
Most decisions concerning the home mortgage interest deduction are made in Brussels and not in The
Hague [Incorrect]
If there are negotiations at international organizations about the climate problem, the European
Commission takes part [Correct]
Together, the member states of the European Union constitute the market with the world’s highest
turnover [Correct]
A Euro is worth less than a dollar [Incorrect]
The Netherlands have already given the European Rescue Fund a guarantee worth of 40 billion Euros [Correct]
The Dutch National Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis has calculated that every Dutchman earns between
1,500 and 2,200 Euros a year because of the internal free market of the 27 EU countries [Correct]
a Scale scores calculated for respondents with not more than 1 missing value.
b Item reverse coded.
c Scale scores calculated for respondents with not more than 2 missing values.
d Each respondent answered a randomly selected subset of 7 of these 21 items. We created an index by counting the
number of correct answers.
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